

**BIEM**

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**BLAB**

**HANDOUTS**

**INTERNATIONAL  
MACROECONOMICS**

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**This handout is written by students with no intention of replacing university materials.**

**It is a useful tool for studying the subject, but does not guarantee preparation as exhaustive and complete as the material recommended by the University.**





# International Macroeconomics

## Lecture 1

In the past 25 years, increase in uncertainty (Brexit 2016, 2018 China-US trade war, Covid 19...) More efficient multilateral coordination is needed: debt resolution, climate change...

Global growth for 2024 is predicted to be 3.1%, consistent with previous years and inflation is expected to fall

In the very long run, we can see that interest rates have been decreasing for around 700 years and the wealth share of the top 1% has been decreasing for over 250 years. It is still decreasing in Continental Europe (L-shape) but increasing since the 1980's in English speaking countries Perception of reality is inaccurate: Public perception is that crime is increasing whereas it's been decreasing since at least the 90's (US)

Expectations are crucial, as shown when AP tweeted (after being hacked) that the White House had been bombed.

A good economic model is simple, flexible and tractable. it has limits and assumptions The basic model links inflation and growth

In the short-medium term: no capital accumulation, the economy does not adjust immediately Aggregate supply: Relationships between prices and production (Questions: How do firms choose their prices, can firms produce more without increasing cost?)

Aggregate demand: Relationship between prices and demands (Who consumes the production, how much do people invest, do interest rates matter?)

We care about changes: In general  $Y = A^\alpha \cdot B^\beta$   $y = \alpha \cdot a + \beta \cdot b$  with  $y$  the change



## Lecture 2

In the short run, we only look at labor costs

In case of uncertainty, prices are higher just in case. We thus get:

Price = Costs \* Mark-up \* Uncertainty.

$$\pi = \omega + \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} + u$$

With  $\pi$ =inflation,  $\omega$ = Change in costs,  $u$ =Change in uncertainty and  $(M_t - M_{t-1}) / M_{t-1}$  = Change in markup

A drop in mark-up can be due to the competition increases

It has increased over the past 60 years and an increase in mark-up is correlated with an increase in profits

bn touches upon employment: The higher the n, the higher the wages. The more rigid a labor market is (high b), the slower the changes in employment

To take into account expected inflation, we have  $w - \pi^e$

Two types of expectation:

Flexible/Rational expectations: Anticipates what government and CB will do, cannot be fooled systematically

Sticky expectations:  $\pi^e = \pi^e$ : People are lazy and can be played by CB and Governments, the ex-

pectations can be either constant or same as the previous year (adaptive) We have that the change in nominal wage-expected inflation = bn

A change in inflation and wages are positively correlated but not linearly

The two equations for supply side are thus  $w - \pi^e = bn$  (wages equation) and

$$\pi = \omega + \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} + u$$

Levels of production:  $Y = AN^\alpha K^\beta$  and the change is  $y = a + \alpha n + \beta k$

In the short run, we have that technology (A) and capital (K) are fixed In Italy, labor productivity has declined over time


We thus get:  $y = \alpha n$  and  $n = \epsilon y$ , with  $\epsilon$  the inefficiency factor ( $\epsilon = 1/\alpha$  Substituting (3)

in(2), we get  $w - \pi^e = b\epsilon y$  and after substituting (2) in (1) we get:  $\pi = \pi^e + b\epsilon y + (\mu - 1) + u$ .

Once we express it in terms of y, we get that the equation for the supply curve is  $y = \frac{1 + (\pi - \pi^e) - (\mu - \pi)}{b\epsilon}$

### Lecture 3

The intercept of the supply curve is  $\pi^e + (\mu - 1) + u + b\epsilon y$  The slope is  $b\epsilon$  Antitrust policy shifts the curve to the left:



Over the last twenty years, market concentration has increased according to the Herfindah- Hirschmann Index and looking at the top 5 revenue share In a flexible market  $b=0$ , the real wage depends on marginal productivity and does not depend on unemployment

A decrease in  $b$  leads to a flatter curve as it implies lower costs, same for an increase in  $\alpha\epsilon$

An increase in  $u$  leads to a leftwards shift of the curve (higher uncertainty means lower output growth)

Global uncertainty has increased significantly since 2012 Uncertainty and democracy have a U-shaped relationship

Assumptions: The policymaker can influence uncertainty via institutional policies: more efficient policies mean less uncertainty and inversely

At the micro level, less uncertainty means lower costs

Institutions can have some impact at the macro level, such as Roman roads.

Using only equation 1 and 2, we get that  $n = \frac{(\pi - \pi^e) + 1 - (\mu - \pi)}{b}$  indicating a link between employment and inflation (Phillips curve). As we know, there is a positive relation between output growth and inflation rate.

The Phillips curve disappears when you extend the time period (1960-2020), the correlation between inflation and economic slowdown has become weaker and weaker (1975-1996 vs 1997- 2018)

## Lecture 4

Demand side: Sources of changes are exogenous components, changes due to interest rate, inflation expectations and banking and financial shocks  
 Today, 70 of US GDP on demand side comes from consumption, 15 from investments, 20 from the government, 13.5 from exports and -17 from imports, both imports and exports have been increasing since 1960

We can divide each element of demand in two components: real (exogenous, does not depend on  $i$ , inflation...) and dependent/monetary component, which is a function of interest rate

$I$  is based on  $\hat{I}$  and  $i$  (negatively)

Aggregate demand increases with a positive net trade balance (negative since the 60s in the US except for services)

The nominal exchange rate is  $e$  (Number of foreign currency units you need to buy one unit of domestic currency) and  $n$  is the real exchange rate, the number of foreign currency units you need to buy one unit of domestic currency minus the difference in prices


The net trade balance decreases when the nominal exchange rate increases (Marshall-Lerner condition)

The nominal exchange rate depends on the interest rate positively:  $e = e(\bar{e} i - i^F)$ , hence the net

trade balance decreases with higher interest rates

A higher interest rate leads to a decrease in private investment

Linking interest rates and inflation: We know that  $\frac{M}{P} = L(i, Y)$ , hence prices affect the real supply of money:



If interest rates are very high, there is less demand for liquidity (as money in the bank earns more)

If monetary mass ( $M$ ) increases, the interest rate goes down (there is too much money in circulation, so banks offer low interest rates as investors don't struggle to borrow)

If inflation or price increases, the interest rate goes up (banks need to offer



higher rates to attract investments as purchasing power is reduced)  
Hence, interest rates are inversely proportional to the growth of the mass of money and proportional to the growth of prices  
We denote autonomous consumption as a



## Lecture 5

Money supply  $m$  depends on central bank monetary policies, with  $m = m$

Positive trend in the money supply until 2021 in the USA

In the Eurozone, it increased until 2022

We denote inflation expectations as  $\phi\pi^e$ , with  $\phi$  the expectation accelerator

Higher inflation expectations increase spending on goods and services today so the expectation accelerator is positive

We denote banking and financial shocks as  $I$

Leverage is the ability to control a large contract value with a relatively small amount of capital. In the futures market, that capital is called a performance bond/initial margin, and is typically 3-12% of a contract's cash value

Leverage = Debt/Equity, peaked around 2010 for US, UK and PIGS

The financial accelerator captures the role of banking and/or financial leverage in influencing aggregate demand:  $I = I_0 - I_1 \times J$


$I$  is a random/exogenous component and  $I_1 J$  represent macroprudential policies:  $J$  is the change in the level of capital and liquidity ratios and  $I_1 > 0$  is the absorber factor/effectiveness of macro-

prudential policy: if the ECB requires higher capital to assets ratios, they can lend less to consumers and firms so lower AD

Macroprudential policies aim at


- preventing the excessive build-up of risk from external factors and market failures, to smoothen the financial cycle
- Making the financial sector more resilient and limiting contagion effects
- A system-wide perspective in financial regulation to create the right set of incentives for market participants

Financial stability is "a condition in which the financial system – which comprises financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances" This mitigates the prospect of disruptions in the financial intermediation process that are severe enough to adversely impact real economic activity



The set of equations we get is  $y = a + (m - \pi) + \phi\pi^e + I$   $m = \bar{m}$   $I = I_0 - I_1 * J$

The equation of the Demand curve expressed in terms of  $y$  is  $y = a + (m - \pi) + \phi\pi^e + I$



The equilibrium solves  $b\epsilon y - 1 + \pi^e + (\mu + u) = -y + a + m + \phi\pi^e + l \Rightarrow b\epsilon y + y = a + m + \phi\pi^e + l + 1 - \pi^e - (\mu + u) \Rightarrow y(1 + b\epsilon) = a + m + l + 1 - (1 - \phi)\pi^e - (\mu + u)$

Supply-side policies that shift the curve:

- Antitrust policies:  $\mu$
- Labor policies:  $b$
- Productivity Policies:  $\epsilon$
- Institutional Policies:  $u$

Demand-side policies that shift the curve:

- Monetary policies:  $m$
- Banking and financial policies:  $l$
- Fiscal policies:  $a$

An increase in  $a, m$  or  $l$  leads to a change of  $\frac{1}{b\epsilon + 1} > 0$  on  $y$

An increase in expected inflation leads to a change of  $-\frac{1-\phi}{b\epsilon + 1} < 0$  on  $y$

An increase in  $\mu$  or  $u$  leads to a change of  $-\frac{1}{b\epsilon + 1} < 0$  on  $y$

An increase in  $b$  or  $\epsilon$  leads to a negative change on  $y$

For inflation, we have:

$$\frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta a} = \frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta m} = \frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta l} = \frac{b\epsilon}{b\epsilon + 1} > 0$$

$$\frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta\pi^e} = \frac{1 + b\epsilon\phi}{b\epsilon + 1} > 0$$

$$\frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta u} = \frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta\mu} = \frac{1}{b\epsilon + 1} > 0$$

$$\frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta b} = \frac{\Delta\pi^*}{\Delta\epsilon} < 0$$

At the equilibrium, the values



$$\pi^* = \frac{(a+\bar{m}+l)b\epsilon+(1+b\epsilon\phi)\pi^e+(\mu+u)-1}{b\epsilon+1}$$

And  $y^* =$

$$\frac{1+(a+\bar{m}+l)-(1-\phi)\pi^e-(\mu+u)}{b\epsilon+1}$$

## Lecture 6

Two schools of economics:

Fresh water (Chicago, Minnesota) are considered hawks and believe expectations are rational (perfectly flexible and endogenous), rational agents understand how the economic system works and the efficient market hypothesis holds


Salt Water Economics (Harvard, MIT, Berkeley) are doves and think the economy is inefficient, expectations are exogenous and it's the role of policies to affect the state of the economy

To stimulate the economy, the government can increase  $G$  or the CB can increase the monetary base ( $M$ ), which also means higher inflation

FWE: People anticipate the intent to stimulate the economy and ask for higher nominal wages (Reminder: For FWE, we have that  $\pi^e = \pi$ ) so we get  $w - \pi = bn$ . Given any  $n$ , the real wages remain constant and there is only a nominal effect. Remember that with rational expectations we have a vertical AS.

According to FWE, demand policies cannot improve the economy, only supply-side policies. SWE economics believe that people do not anticipate what the CB or Government want to do, so there is no change in the nominal wage they ask for,  $w - \hat{\pi} = bn$ .

In that case, in the case of an increase in inflation, real wages go down. Hence, under SWE's view, demand policies can be helpful to boost the economy.



The great Moderation from the 1980s to 2007: Stable but low GDP growth, softer business cycles and CB is able to manage them, low and stable inflation, financial innovation leading to high private debt

In 24 OECD countries between 1983 and 1998, we observe 11 drops in both

GDP and inflation volatility, 20 drops in inflation volatility and no countries with an increase in both

The drivers of finance are Technology and Rules

Financial innovation is the creation of novel Financial products that allow larger leverage. Its drivers are creativity, changes in tech and rules

Organizations set the rules banks should follow addressing banking and financial risks: Two approaches: Structural and prudential Regulation

Structural regulation treats the financial sector as special (incalculable risks, domino effect, systemic crises) and as such must be subjected to restrictions and prohibitions to avoid excessive risk taking

Exemples:

- Compulsory reserve requirements
- Ceiling on Loans
- Ceilings on interest rates
- Structural and conduct regulation (investment vs commercial banks)
- Financial repression: Constraints on competition

Prudential regulation considers that all risk can be calculated and hedged with appropriate protections: use of capital ratios such as capital or liquidity requirements. During the Great Moderation, banks has more freedom to operate as long as they kept sufficient capital and liquidity ratios

Prudential Regulation=Financial Deregulation: Bankers enjoy more freedom in setting their business prices and business designs, leading to more innovation Deregulation increased the size of the financial industry, increased complexity and interconnection


The Great Moderation was NICE: Non-inflationary Consistent Expansion Good disinflation has lower inflation with stable GDP growth

Increase of leverage from due to prudential regulation and financial innovation Fitting the great moderation into the basic model, we get that private agents have rational expectations ( $\pi^e = \pi$ ) and that in the labor market, wages incorporate the inflation ( $w = \pi + bn$ ) Nominal wages, real wages and employment growth are positively correlated

On the supply side, we still have  $AS = y = \frac{1 - (\mu + u)}{\varepsilon b}$

With AD shocks, the rational agent anticipates the permanent shocks, which become AS changes and neglects temporary ones which just trigger inflation We consider that  $J=0$  (banking regulation is at its optimal level) so  $l = l_0 - h_1 J = l_0$

We get on the demand side  $AD: y = a + (m - \pi) + \phi \pi^e + l_0$





During the great moderation: innovation shifted the supply curve to the left by increasing efficiency and Financial deregulation shifted the demand curve, as it favors high leverage (shock to  $l_0$ )



## Lecture 7

The Great Financial Crisis:

Drivers:

- Regulation: Prudential Regulation was bad financial policy
- Risk Miscalculation: markets are not efficient
- Wrong economic policy: Lax monetary policy

High levels of private debt drove Balance Sheet recession, both relative to GDP and in absolute terms

This led firms and households to increase their savings to repay debt, which led to higher savings (higher financial surplus)

In the USA, savings increased while expenditure decreases, leading overall to lower consumption and lower investment, especially in the residential sector

All this led to slower/negative growth

In Japan, the housing bubble led to a slowdown in the growth rate and would've been worse without government intervention

BS recession featured: Low growth rate, low inflation and high debt (Financial bubble and credit boom)

Financial Bubble and credit boom: In the early 2000s, the ratio between house prices and income sharply increased

There was also an increasing difference between price and earnings in the S&P, which suggests irrational expectations about the future

The order it happened it was: Credit boom (which makes the post recession financial crisis longer and harsher), leading to financial bubbles (leading to a longer and harsher post-recession), leading to economic recessions

Historically, crisis has followed different paths: low credit excess took two years to recover, medium and high credit excess more than 5 years

2007 was very long and very harsh

Designing and implementing deregulation requires financing it, through low and stable interest rates

The three pillars that define monetary rules: Monetary policy tools (nominal interest rate), monetary policy goal (macroeconomic goals) and monetary policy actors (Central Bank). Combining the 3 gives us the monetary rule

Our Benchmark is the Taylor Rule:  $i_T = \hat{r} + \pi + \alpha(\pi - \pi^*) + \beta(y - y^*)$ , which relates nominal interest

rates with inflation and output growth

We thus obtain  $i^{TR}$ , the Taylor Rule interest Rate, which we can compare to  $i^{FED}$  to obtain the stance of the Fed policy

Shortly before the crisis, the monetary policy diverged from the Standard monetary policy, with federal funds being way too low

We see the Great Moderation as deviation from the standard policy, on both financial regulation (de-regulation) and monetary policy (Lax monetary policy).

We can thus consider the years before the Great Moderation as the Great Deviation

Yet if the economy is efficient and agents are rational, the Great Deviation doesn't produce real effects as it can be considered a Bubble (financial and monetary events and are neutral)

Both business and financial cycles are recurring and sinusoidal



In conclusion there was a policy failure: Economically (Prudential regulation is a bad idea), Risk miscalculation (markets are not efficient a expectations are not rational) and wrong monetary policy (too lax)



## Lecture 8

The crisis was due to human actions and inaction

The 2008/2009 financial crisis represented a significant drop in world GDP in both developing and developed countries

There is a strong link between the S&P 500 and consumer sentiment

The GFC involved an increase in unemployment rate (8.8 M jobs lost, peaked at 10%)

All races and ethnicities were affected, although with different volatility, starting level and magnitude

Men were more impacted than women

Domino effect; One event has a knock-on effect throughout the economy

Sub-prime lending is lending to people in the US who may have difficulties in maintaining the repayment schedule (NINJA=No income, No job, no Assets)

The effect of deregulation was increasing competition between banks, monetary lead to low interest rates, market failure was due to risk miscalculation

Sharp increase in both ratios of Mortgage and Non-mortgage lending to GDP and constant rise in the weight of mortgage lending for banks


The subprime market: from \$ 94 billion (2001) to \$ 685 billion (2006) and subprime loans went from 6 percent to a fifth of the overall mortgage market

Easy access to credit led to low and declining subprime mortgages interest rates

Increasing faith led to higher housing prices (especially between 2002 and 2006), low delinquency rates (past due payments) and low foreclosure rates (taking control of the mortgaged property) Places with lot of subprime had lower increases in price


Loans were made using previous loans as collateral

Subprime loans were not localized but widespread over all the US



We have: high borrower risk, increasing risk linked to the product and high total default risk In 2006 a fall in the subprime market occurs, with a raise in mortgage interest rates in 2004

The fall was characterized by declining housing prices, increasing delinquency and foreclosure rates



15 percent of subprime loans were not considered fully repayable, 2 percent of the overall mortgage market

The financial industry can be seen as a Big, interconnected, Complex Black box (BIBC): Not new,

existed already in Rome with capital invested in Asia by Romans that collapsed due to suspension of payments

Eventually, the crisis affects all financial markets and the world economy

The Great Crisis is a case of a Balance sheet recession: High leverage, low growth, low inflation  
Reminder: Real wage =  $w - \pi$




### Lecture 9


Cash can be kept, at a cost equal to the interest rate, or to buy bonds (investment)

When  $M/P$  increases, people buy bonds (they already have the cash needed for transaction), price of bonds increase ( $i$  goes down), people keep part in cash

$$\delta i = -(m - \pi)$$



The change in interest rate is proportional to a change in price. Usually, the CB can affect  $i$  by changing  $m$



This occurs when  $i$  is very low and all the money is absorbed if  $m$  increases so monetary policy is not effective

Liquidity preference is risk aversion

The outcome of the liquidity trap are that money is held instead of circulating and an increase on the money supply has no effect on aggregate demand

After the Great Recession, there are abnormal relationships between money and interest rates, money and inflation and money and growth

Most developed countries have low growth and inflation rate

Rate of inflation is consistently higher for emerging markets and developing



economies

Using the AD-AS model, we can explain the change: a drop in the financial accelerator  $I$  lowers the AD curve and leads to both inflation and output being lower

During and after the crisis, we see a sharp increase in the monetary base but not in  $i$  in the UK/US/Eurozone/Japan. GDP does not increase either despite the stock of money

Why is that? In periods of uncertainty, people prefer more liquid assets over less liquid assets which reinforces the liquidity trap, and firms being net lenders (firms prefer to save money rather than to invest it)

The BS of the CB has short-term public bonds as assets and the monetary base (cash+banking reserves) and profits as Liabilities+Net Worth

The CB used three unconventional tools: ZIRP (Zero Lower bound) and NIRP (Negative Lower Bound) policies, Quantitative easing (QE) policies and Forward guidance (GF) policies

ZIRP and NIRP: Every day banks have reserves surplus and deficit so some sell and other buy on the Interbank market, that determines the overnight interest rates

The OIR is somewhere above the Overnight Deposit rate and below the overnight interbank rate (in the Central Bank Corridor)

Quantitative easing: Adds long term public bonds and private securities to the assets of the CB. The CB buys bonds from firms, banks and government through open-market operations to increase the monetary base. These assets might be risky

Forward guidance: Open Mouth operations means announcing tomorrow's interest rates today, hence affecting expectations

### Lecture 10

Four different policies to deal with liquidity traps: Conventional monetary policy, aggregate supply policies, fiscal policies and financial policies

Conventional monetary policy is ineffective with no real or nominal effect After the great crisis, expectations depend on beliefs (exogenous)

Aggregate supply policies: Doesn't work as if the risk aversion becomes abnormally high, money is held leading to no consumption or investment (private demand deficit) and more supply or lower prices don't guarantee more sales

Fiscal policies can work as the public demand (either through spending or reduced taxation)

compensates the private demand deficit

In our framework, the Fiscal multiplier is positive and equal to 1 ( $FM = \frac{\Delta y^*}{\Delta \bar{a}} = 1$ ) and the fiscal policy triggers inflation (inflation accelerator IA)  $IA = \frac{\Delta \pi^*}{\Delta \bar{a}} = b\varepsilon$

Generally, using the multiplier and accelerator we can calculate the sacrifice ratio  $\frac{IA}{FM} = b\varepsilon$  but in the sign and size of the fiscal multiplier is controversial

Overall, we can say it depends (normal distribution centered around 0.8) and it depends on the type of spending



|                            | Year 1 | Year 2 | Year 3 | Year 4 | Year 5 |
|----------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Government Investment      | 0.61   | 0.55   | 0.49   | 0.54   | 0.71   |
| Government Consumption     | 0.51   | 0.33   | 0.13   | 0.02   | 0.01   |
| Targeted Lumpsum Transfers | 0.45   | 0.23   | -0.07  | -0.28  | -0.35  |
| General Lumpsum Transfers  | 0.30   | 0.13   | -0.12  | -0.28  | -0.31  |
| Corporate Income Taxes     | 0.53   | 0.56   | 0.51   | 0.58   | 0.80   |
| Labor Income Taxes         | 0.40   | 0.44   | 0.42   | 0.41   | 0.43   |
| Consumption Taxes (VAT)    | 0.38   | 0.32   | 0.17   | 0.07   | 0.05   |

Finally, financial policies: To prevent money holding, we can lower capital ratios to increase loans and private investments BUT this can also increase financial stability risk

In our model, this means lowering  $J$  (hence increasing  $I$ )

Post 2008, we had a gradual and postponed tightening (increase in  $J$ )

After the Great financial crises, both GAAP, IFRS and Basel RWA required higher capital ratios

In Georgia for example, the NGB lowered its rate (due to low inflation and negative output gap) and raised the banking reserve requirements to mitigate future financial risks

Forward guidance: A CB implementing a Forward guidance policy provides information about the future path of the interest rates and/or monetary aggregates. The announcements are called Open-Mouth Operations

We have data dependent forward guidance: We anticipate a zero interest rate will be appropriate as long as unemployment stays over 6.5% and inflation is predicted to be below 2.5%

The key assumptions behind this is that interest rate expectations and inflation expectations are associated, via interest rate announcement ( $i^a$ ):  $\hat{\pi} = f(i^a) = f(i^e)$ .

In a liquidity trap, it can be a useful tool


On the supply and demand side, we have a change in  $\hat{\pi}$ , leading to a rightward shift of the demand curve and a leftward (increase) in the supply curve

Conclusion: Announcements of future expansionary monetary policy (lower  $i$ ) can be effective in a liquidity trap




## Lecture 11


Covid 19 impacted all countries but differently Huge impact in Eurozone  
 Financial impact was important but recovered quickly, although at different paces



## The impact of coronavirus on stock markets since the start of the outbreak




In our model, we have an aggregate demand shock (drop in  $a$ ), leading to a drop in the AD curve and an aggregate supply shock, leading to higher uncertainty and disruptions in the supply chain lead to higher mark-ups



The covid shock was deeper than the financial crisis but recovery was faster In all EU countries, we had a huge fiscal stimulus and an increase in debt

Figure 0.5 Fiscal, monetary, and financial sector policy responses to the pandemic, by country income group



Fiscal stimulus translated to a higher  $a$  and thus an increase in the AD curve Today, we still have high inflation rates, although they are dropping



### Useful recaps

$$Y = AN^\alpha K^\beta \text{ and } y = \alpha n + \beta k$$

The formulas for the Supply curve  $\pi = \pi^e + b\epsilon y + (\mu - 1) + u$   $y = \frac{1 + (\pi - \pi^e) - (\mu - \pi)}{b\epsilon}$

If expectations, are rational, we have that  $\pi^e = \pi$

final equation:  $\pi = w + (\mu - 1) + u$


AS is vertical in the case where expectations are rational Higher interest rates lead to a stronger currency

$-\delta i = m - \pi$  ( $m - \pi$  is the dependent component), the inflation expectations are modelled through  $\phi \pi^e$

Finally, the financial sector affects real demand though leverage (access to credit), which depends on macroprudential regulation (if regulation becomes stricter  $J$  increases:  $l = l_0 - l_1 J$ )

Hence, we get:  $y = a + m - \pi + \phi \pi^e + l$   $m = \tilde{m} l = l_0 - l_1 J$

AD can be vertical when we are in a liquidity trap






## Lecture 1: Introduction

In the last 25 years, increasing uncertainty in the world (WUI) In the past 700 years, interest rates have overall decreased

U-shape for share of total income for 1% in English Speaking countries, L-shaped in Europe and Japan

The basic model:

Assumptions: In the short-medium term: No capital accumulation and the economy does not adjust immediately



We care about changes in variables, not their value. We use the fact that  $Y = A^\alpha \times B^\beta$  means that the change is equal to  $y = \alpha \times a + \beta \times b$

## Lecture 2: The basic model

Analyzing the Supply side:

How do firms set prices, what are the impact of wages change.

Three elements determine the price: Costs (in short run, we only look at labor costs), mark-up (lower the higher the competition), and uncertainty.'

We get the following formula:

$$\pi = \omega + \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{M_{t-1}} + u$$

We define  $\mu$  as  $\frac{M_t}{M_{t-1}}$  and obtain that the change in mark-up is  $\mu - 1$

Over time, the markup and profit have overall increased (since the 1960s)

Wages depend on the rigidity of the labor market ( $b$ ) and the level of employment ( $n$ ). The higher the two are, the higher the increase in wages


Wages are also affected by expected inflation

Expectations about inflation are formed in two ways: Flexible (people are smart and anticipate what will be done, so they can't systematically be fooled) and sticky expectations (Can be played by CB and government, can be same as last year or a constant for example)

We name the change in nominal wage  $w$  and we get

$$w - \pi^e = bn$$

Hence, for a given  $bn$ , a higher expected inflation will lead to higher change in nominal wages. In Italy, rowt in wages and inflation are highly correlated but not linearly



For the production function, we assume that it is of the form  $Y = AN^\alpha K^\beta$  so  $y = a + \alpha n + \beta k$

Since in the short-run capital is constant, we get  $y = \alpha n$

In Italy, labor productivity declined over time

We call  $\epsilon$  the inefficiency factor, the inverse of labor productivity  $\epsilon = \frac{1}{\alpha}$ , so to double production, a firm needs to multiply the labor factor by  $2 \times \epsilon$


So our third equation is  $n = \epsilon y$

So our three equations are:  $\pi = w + (\mu - 1) + u$ ,  $w - \pi^e = bn$ ,  $n = \epsilon y$

Putting them together, we obtain:  $\pi = \pi^e + b\epsilon y + (\mu - 1) + u$




Solving for  $y$ , we get:  $y = \frac{1 + (\pi - \pi^e) - (\mu - \pi)}{b\varepsilon}$



### Lecture 3: The supply side

The equation of the curve is  $\pi = \pi^e + b\epsilon y + (\mu - 1) + u$

hence, a shift in the curve (that changes the intercept) is a change in  $\pi^e$ ,  $u$  or  $\mu$



A shift in the slope is a change in  $b$  or  $\epsilon$  (does not affect the intercept)

Increase in antitrust legislation leads to lower markups and higher output and lower inflation Irl in the US, market concentration lowered until 2000 then grew again

Weaker labor policies lead to a lower costs hence higher outputs and lower inflation

A decrease in labor policies leads to a more flexible labor market ( $b$  closer to 0) so the curve shifts downwards, leading to lower inflation and higher increase in output

Higher efficiency of labor ( $\alpha \uparrow / \epsilon \downarrow$ ) also shifts the curve downwards: Higher increase in output

and lower inflation For both:


A change in  $u$  due to institutional policies shifts the curve left or right Irl, uncertainty and democracy have a U-shape relationship

When we express the supply curve equation in terms of  $n$ , we get  $n =$

$\frac{(\pi - \pi^e) + 1 - (\mu - \pi)}{b}$  indicating a link between employment and inflation (Philips

Curve)

However irl the link between employment and inflation has become weaker and weaker



#### Lecture 4: Demand Curve

4 components: Exogenous, changes in interest rates, inflation expectations and Banking and Financial shocks

Imports and export have both increased since 1960

Two components of demand: Real/Autonomous (exogenous and do not depend on interest rate and inflation) and dependent (function of interest rate)

Investment has both an autonomous and an endogenous component  $NX = X - IM$

if the country imports, aggregate demand decreases

Services are in a surplus in the US but goods a (larger) deficit

$e$  is the nominal exchange rate: number of foreign currencies to buy one unit of domestic currency

$n$  is the real exchange rate: number of foreign currencies to buy one unit of domestic currency minus the differences in price

When  $e$  increases, the net Trade Balance decreases (Marshall-Lerner)


The nominal exchange rate depends **positively** on the interest rate and negatively on the foreign interest rate:  $e = e(\bar{e}, i - i^F)$

Hence, we get that Net Trade Balance decreases with higher interest rates




(BCS e rises) When  $i$  increases,  $I$  increases,  $NX$  decreases

From Macro, we know that  $M/P = L(i, Y)$ , so prices affect the real supply of money and interest rate affect the demand for money




Percentage of Components of U.S. GDP on the Demand Side




**An increase in inflation increases interest rates and an increase in monetary amss decreases interest rates'**

Hence  $\delta i = -(m - \pi)$

U.S. Goods Trade Balance as a Percentage of GDP





### Lecture 5: Demand Side

Money supply depends on CB (exogenous). In 1, it increased from 2000 to 2021 (US) and 2022 (EU) then decreased but across history it goes up and down  
We have that  $y = a - \delta i = a + \bar{m} - \pi$

Inflation expectations are modelled with  $\varphi \pi^e$ , with  $\varphi$  the expectation's accelerator

Higher expected inflation increases spending on goods today. The accelerator is positive and represents how sensitive the demand is to changes in expectations

Finally  $I$  represents Banking and Financial shocks

Leverage is the ability to control a large contract value with a relatively small amount of capital It is equal to Debt over Equity (sharply increased right before 2008)

The financial accelerator represents the role of banking and leverage in influencing AD

$$I = I_0 - I_1 * J$$

$I_0$  is exogenous and  $J$  is the change in the level of capital and liquidity ratios.  $I_1$  is strictly positive and is the absorber factor that measures the effectiveness of macroprudential policy

The higher it is, the more restrictive the policies and the lower the AD

Macro prudential policies aim to prevent excessive build-up of risk and to smoothen the financial cycle, make the financial sector more resilient and limit contagion effects. A

system-wide perspective in financial regulations to create the right set of incentives



So the three AD formulas are:  $y = a + (m - \pi) + \varphi \pi^e + I$      $m = \bar{m}$      $I = I_0 - I_1 J$

Expressing AD in function of inflation, we get:  $\pi = -y + a + m + \varphi \pi^e + I$



Setting  $AD=AS$ , we obtain  $b\epsilon y - 1 + \pi e + (\mu + u) = -y + a + m + \phi \pi e + l$  so:

$$y^* = \frac{1 + (a + \bar{m} + l) - (1 - \phi)\pi^e - (\mu + u)}{b\epsilon + 1}$$



$$\pi^* = \frac{(a + \bar{m} + l)b\epsilon + (1 + b\epsilon\phi)\pi^e + (\mu + u) - 1}{b\epsilon + 1}$$

Policies that shift the curve on the supply side are:

Antitrust policies ( $\mu$ ), labor policies ( $b$ ), productivity policies ( $\epsilon$ ) and institutional policies ( $u$ ) Policies that shift the curve on the demand side are Monetary policies ( $m$ ), banking and financial policies ( $l$ ) and fiscal policies ( $a$ )



## Lecture 6: The Great Moderation

Fresh Water Economics (Chicago, Minnesota) (Hawks) vs Salt water (Harvard, MIT Berkeley) (Doves)

FW: Expectations are rational, rational agents understand how the system works and EMH SW: Economy is inefficient, expectations are exogenous and policies have a role to affect the state of the economy

The impact of an increase in AD demand due to higher  $m$  or  $a$

According to FWE: People anticipate so they ask for higher nominal wages:  $w - \pi = bn$  Hence, for a given  $n$  real wages remain constant and other are only nominal effects Hence, demand policies can't improve the economy, only supply policies


Reminder: With RE we have a vertical AS

SWE: People do not anticipate so they do not change the nominal wage they ask for and


$$w - \hat{\pi} = bn$$

Hence an increase in inflation leads to lower real wages and lower real costs, so demand policies can be useful to improve the economy

FWE:



SWE:



The Great Moderation is from the mid 1980s to 2007, which soft business cycles, low and stable inflation and financial innovation (high private debt)  
 People prefer low volatility: Stable income, smooth consumption and no employment fluctuations

This was associated with low inflation volatility: In the OECD, 20 countries experienced one between 1983 and 1998 and 11 in both GDP and inflation volatility

The drivers of finance are technology and rules

Financial innovation is the creation of novel financial products that allow larger leverage. it's driven by Creativity, changes in tech and changes in rules

Regulation is rules setting and supervision is rules enforcement Two different approaches to regulation: Structural vs prudential

Structural regulation treats finance uniquely, and the banking sector must be subjected to restrictions and prohibitions to avoid excessive risk-taking  
 Structural regulation includes reserve requirements, ceilings on loans, ceilings on interest rates, splitting CB and IB...

Prudential regulation assumes all risk-distribution can be calculated and risks can be hedged Capital ratios are used instead of constraints and prohibitions (Capital and Liquidity Requirements)

During the Great Moderation, banks had more freedom to operate as long as they had sufficient capital and liquidity ratios

Prudential Regulation lead to Financial Deregulation and higher financial innovation Deregulation increased the size of finance (relative to GDP), Complexity and Interconnection The GM was NICE (Non-inflationary consistent expansion)


Because of the consistent inflation, we can use the FW framework and assume rational expectations

In this case, we get that  $y = \frac{1-(\mu-u)}{\epsilon b}$  so a shock in demand doesn't affect  $y$  as it was already anticipated

On the demand side we assume that policy is perfectly effective so  $J$  is 0

So  $y = a + m - \pi + \varphi\pi^e + l_0$

The effects of an increase in efficiency (AS) and Financial Deregulation (AD):



## Lecture 7: The Great Financial crises, 2007

The Great Crisis' drivers are regulation, market and policy failures. It was a Balance Sheet Recession and monetary policy contributed to it.


Prudential regulation was a mistake, markets are not efficient and the monetary policy was too lax

The Recession was driven by high levels of private debt (different from business cycles recessions)

These high levels of debt led to an increase in savings to repay debt (higher financial surplus), during the crisis savings increased while expenditures decreased

The overall consequence was lower consumption and investment, especially in residential. We thus obtain slower/negative growth

In Japan:



A BS recession is marked by a lower growth rate, inflation and high debt

The private debt was due to an increase in housing prices relative to income

Increase in the P/E ration in the S&P, suggesting irrational expectations

Overall we have credit booms + Financial bubbles + Economic Recessions. The first two worsened the post recession crisis

The recession was very long and very painful

To design and implement deregulation, it must be financed and requires low interest rates to increase the overall leverage

Three pillars define a monetary rule: The tool (Nominal interest rate), the goal (stability) and the actor (CBB). The three of them form a monetary rule

We use the Taylor rule as a benchmark:  $i_T = \hat{r} + \pi + \alpha(\pi - \pi^*) + \beta(y - y^*)$

With it we can obtain the  $i^{TR}$  that we can then compare with the CB's interest rate and obtaining

the stance of the CB. It artificially lowered interest rates before 2007

We can consider the years before the Great Crisis to be the Great Deviation:

De-regulation and lax monetary policy

Yet if the economy were efficient and agents were rational than the great deviation shouldn't produce real effects as bubbles are financial and monetary events and neutral



## Lecture 8: Great Financial Crises

The Great Crisis led to a big drop in world GDP growth, massive drop in employment rate in the US and affected every race and gender

Subprime lending is providing loans who may struggle to repay them: NINJA (No income, job or assets)

Deregulation led to high competition among banks (supply trigger) and lax monetary policy leads to low interest rates (demand trigger), leading to risk miscalculation

Subprime lending in particular massively increased between 2001 and 2006 (multiplied by 7). This increased housing prices, associated to low delinquency and foreclosure rates

The way it worked is loan to a SB borrower to buy a house, the house is then overvalued and used as a collateral for another loan...

The fall started in 2006, with an increase in mortgage interest rate, decrease in housing price and an increase in delinquency and foreclosure rates


Via the Domino effect, the crisis affects all the financial markets

If expectations are exogenous, real wage changes and employment growth are affected by expectations




### Lecture 9: Liquidity Trap


An increase in  $M/P$  means that people buy bonds, so the interest rate decreases and people keep part in cash  
 The change of interest rate is  $\delta i = -(m - \pi)$



Part of demand depends on interest rate (Investment and export)  
 In a liquidity trap, interest rate is very low (price of holding cash) and an increase in  $M$  has no impact on  $i$  so monetary policy is not effective



We end up with only holding instead of circulation, an increase in the money supply would have no impact on AD  
 After the Great Recession: Low growth and low inflation (most developed countries especially), abnormal relationship between money and  $i$ , inflation and growth. This was due to a drop in the financial accelerator shifting AD downwards





After the Great Crisis, inflation and GDP do not grow despite large increase in monetary base, due to higher cash preference and firms prefer to save

CB Balance sheet:

ASSETS: Short Term Public bonds

Liabilities and Net Worth: Monetary base (Cash and banking Reserves), Profits

Three Unconventional tools were used by advanced countries: ZIRP (Zero Lower Bound) and NIRP (Negative Lower Bound) policies, quantitative easing and Forward Guidance

**ZIRP and NIRP:** Three interest rates: Overnight Interbank rate, Overnight deposit rate and Overnight Lending rate

The first and last one form the central Bank corridor, and the second is between the two

**Quantitative Easing:** The CB increases its BS by adding Long-term public bonds and private securities through open-market operations, changing long maturity assets into liquid money

**Forward Guidance:** Announcing future interest rates today to influence expectations of inflation




## Lecture 10: The Liquidity Trap in the BM

Four Possible policies:

- Monetary policies
- AS policies
- Fiscal Policies
- Financial Policies

Conventional Monetary policy is useless (no real or nominal effect)

When in a liquidity trap, there is no link between AD and  $i$  as the change in  $i$  is 0



In a liquidity trap, AS policies (ex: antitrust legislation) don't work: If risk aversion is too high, money is held and lower prices don't mean more sales. They have no effect on  $y$ , only on inflation

Fiscal policies (Increase in  $g$ ): It can work, as it compensates for the lack in private demand due to risk aversion

In our Liquidity Trap framework,  
the **fiscal multiplier (FM)**- change in output growth given a change in the fiscal policy - is **positive** and = 1

$$AD: y = a + l + \phi \hat{\pi} \qquad FM = \frac{\Delta y^*}{\Delta \hat{a}} = 1$$

On top the fiscal policy triggers inflation (**inflation accelerator IA**):

$$AS: \pi = \hat{\pi} + b\epsilon y + (\mu - 1) + u \qquad IA = \frac{\Delta \pi^*}{\Delta \hat{a}} = b\epsilon$$

**Note:** generally using the multiplier and the accelerator we can calculate the **sacrifice ratio**.

In this case: 
$$\frac{IA}{FM} = b\epsilon$$

However, irl, it is a controversial topic

Financial policies: Lowering capital ratios can increase loans but reduce stability. Post 2008, we had a gradual and postponed tightening

**Forward Guidance:** Monetary policy announcements are called Open-Mouth operation. It can be data dependent (if xxxx, then yyyy). The assumption



behind it is that the interest rate expectations and inflation expectations are associated, and it can be an effective tool in a LT. Affects both AS and AD



### Lecture 11: Covid 19

Slower or negative growth worldwide, crash of stock market Decrease of a increase of markup and uncertainty

Covid 19 was deeper but faster recovery than Great Crisis

Heavy fiscal cost everywhere, especially high-earning countries to compensate by increasing a



## Lecture 1

Economic globalization: Increasing interdependence of world economies through:

- Exchange of intermediate and final goods and services
- Flow of production factors (capital, labor)
- Wide and rapid spread of technologies

Three waves of globalization: Innovation (reduction in transportation and communication costs, new technologies and new products...) and economic/trade policies

First one: 1850-1914: The Great Divergence, through

- Transport: Steamships and railways
- Other tech: Refrigeration, telegraph
- International economic cooperation and spread of liberal economic policies
- First unbundling: Separating production and consumption and switch to secondary sector from primary

It doesn't include the whole world and it tends to be inter-industry trade


WWI and WWII are a reversal in globalization with the Great Depression and economic nationalism

The Second Wave is from 1945 to the 70s and features new players. Driven by technological progress: Containers, civil aviation, telephone...

The types of exchanges that were possible and profitable also changed: Trade in similar things between similar countries, intra-industry and North-North Trade

Economic policy also changed, with multilateral cooperation in trade liberalization (GATT) Third wave is from the 80s: Global production networks (GVC), second unbundling is the end of the need to perform most manufacturing stages in the same location; growing roles of developing countries

Trade liberalization: WTO, preferential trade agreements Since 2019, increase in Regional Trade Agreements (RTA):



Strong development of ICT favors globalization:

Countries gain from trade, thanks to Specialization, economies of scale, increased competition, productivity gains and product variety

This can be due to differences in climate and resources, but also labor productivity and relative supplies of K, L and Land and their use

The size of an economy is related to the volume of imports and exports: Larger economies produce more and so have more to sell, and they generate more




income from goods and services sold so they are able to import more

The gravity model is  $T_{ij} = \frac{AY_iY_j}{D_{ij}}$ , with A a constant, T the amount of bilateral

trade,  $Y_i$  and  $Y_j$  the GDP of country i and j and  $D_{ij}$  is the distance

Good but not perfect (NE, BE and IRE trade much more with the US than that)

Potential factors:



- Distance
- Cultural affinity
- Geography
- Multinational corporations
- Borders
- Trade Agreements

Recent challenges to globalization: US-China trade war, covid, Houthis

The main costs of globalization are income distribution/inequality, structural adjustments (jobs and technological change), increased interdependence (geopolitical tensions), impact on the environment and climate change.

Offshoring is the relocation of tasks of the value chain abroad while outsourcing is when a task is externalized to a supplier

Global Value chains are unbundled production, with different stages of production located across different countries



## Lecture 2: Ricardian Model

Benefits from trade come from economies of scale and differences (production factors, differences...)

$a_j^i$  is the unit labour requirement to produce good  $i$  in country  $j$ , and  $\frac{1}{a_j^i}$  is the productivity of labor in industry  $i$  in country  $j$

Even if Portugal has an absolute advantage in both wine and cloth production, both countries still benefit from trade. This is because of opportunity cost: To produce 1 cloth,  $a_c$  units of labor are needed, with which you could produce  $1/a_w$  units of wine, so with  $a_c/a_w$  the opportunity cost of cloth in terms of wine

Since the opportunity cost of cloth is lower in the UK, so they have a comparative advantage in the production of cloth. Even a country with an absolute disadvantage in all goods has a comparative advantage, we can always define a comparative advantage if countries are different. Both countries gain from trade if they specialize according to the comparative advantage


The model: Only one factor of production (L and  $L^*$ )n supply of labor is constant and homogenous, L is perfectly mobile between industries and L is immobile across countries, two goods X and Y, constant return to scale in production, perfectly competitive markets, and same tastes in Home and Foreign

The production possibilities frontier: PPF:  $a_x Q_x + a_y Q_y = L$ , solving for  $Q_y$  we get

$$Q_Y = \frac{L}{a_y} - \frac{a_x}{a_y} Q_X.$$

The vertical intercept is  $L/a_y$  and represents the max amount of Y that home can produce,  $L/a_x$  is the horizontal intercept and  $a_x/a_y$  is the slope (opportunity cost of good x in terms of good y).

We assume  $\frac{a_x}{a_y} < \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$  Home has a comparative advantage in x and foreign in y.





To determine what is actually produced, we must use prices, wages and preferences. Since we

have perfect competition, the price is the marginal cost ( $i = a_i \times w_i$ ). Since

$$p_x = a_x w_x \rightarrow w_x = \frac{p_x}{a_x}$$

If wages for x are higher than in y, workers will only work in the X industry. When in


autarky, the economy must produce both goods, which requires  $w_x = w_y \rightarrow \frac{p_x}{a_x} = \frac{p_y}{a_y} \rightarrow \frac{p_x}{p_y} = \frac{a_x}{a_y}$

in autarky, the relative price of good X is equal to the opportunity cost of X in terms of Y

The budget constraint is  $p_x Q_x + p_y Q_y = \text{Income}$ , with income =  $wL$

Solving for  $Q_y$ , we get:  $Q_y = \frac{wL}{p_y} - \frac{p_x}{p_y} Q_x$ . In autarky, the Budget Curve coincides with the PP,

as we consume what we produce. Given the BC, consumers choose the bundle of consumption that maximizes utility (tangency/highest indifference curve)



Overall, in autarky, the quantity of x produced is the quantity consumed, efficient production is on the PPF, full employment



### Lecture 3: Ricardian Model


If free trade is possible (no costs), balanced (no international trade in financial assets) and  $\frac{a_x}{a_y} = \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$  (the opportunity cost of X is lower in home than in foreign/Home has a comparative advantage in producing X and Foreign for Y)

The World Relative Supply is  $\frac{Q_X^S + Q_X^{*S}}{Q_Y^S + Q_Y^{*S}} = f\left(\frac{p_x}{p_y}\right)$  and the world relative demand is:

$\frac{Q_X^D + Q_X^{*D}}{Q_Y^D + Q_Y^{*D}} = f\left(\frac{p_x}{p_y}\right)$  If  $\frac{p_x}{p_y} < \frac{a_x}{a_y}$  in home  $\frac{p_x}{p_y} < \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*} \rightarrow w_x < w_y$  so home specialises in the production of Y

Since  $\frac{a_x}{a_y} < \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$  foreign specialises in Y too and only produces Y: The Relative supply curve

is:




If  $\frac{a_x}{a_y} = \frac{p_x}{p_y} < \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$

In home, same situation as in autarky was wages for x are equal to wages for y, indifferent between X or Y

For foreign, since they have a relative advantage in Y, they will produce exclusively Y so

$$RS \in \left[0, \frac{\frac{L}{a_x}}{\frac{L^*}{a_y^*}}\right]$$

Relative supply:






If  $\frac{a_x}{a_y} < \frac{p_x}{p_y} < \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$  home specialises in X and Foreign in Y and the relative supply is  $\frac{L}{L^*} \frac{a_x}{a_y}$

If  $\frac{a_x}{a_y} < \frac{p_x}{p_y} = \frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$  Home specialises in X and Foreign does not specialize (RS is horizontal)

RD is the relative demand for good X as a function of the relative price. If  $\frac{p_x}{p_y}$  decreases then  $RD_x$  increases

We can thus use a normal sloping curve:



When two countries open up to trade, the relative price of X converges. Here, home is completely specialized in producing good X and foreign is completely specialized in producing good Y

Gains from trade: While home can produce  $1/a_y$  units of good Y, it can produce  $1/a_x$  units of good X

What home does is buy  $\frac{p_x}{p_y a_x}$  units of good Y, which is higher than  $1/a_y$  because




$\frac{p_x}{p_y} > \frac{a_x}{a_y}$  A value line is a line that represents the value generated by a

combination of production:  $wL = p_x Q_x + p_y Q_y$  so  $Q_y = \frac{wL}{p_y} - \frac{p_x}{p_y} Q_x$


Comparing the Value Line with the PPF, we get:

Bundles not previously affordable (on the PPF) are now affordable (on the VL)

The larger the difference between free trade and autarky relative price the bigger the gains. The same logic applies for Foreign



When RD intersects RS on a horizontal line, one country is specialized and the other makes both and the one that doesn't specialise doesn't gain nor lose (the other gains)



### Lecture 4: The Ricardian Model and Myths

Free trade is not only beneficial if your country is strong enough to stand up to foreign competition, it depends on comparative advantages, absolute productivity is neither necessary nor sufficient

It doesn't hurt other countries when it's based on low wages, the source of comparative advantages is not relevant

Trade also doesn't exploit a country due to its workers receiving lower wages

The key results from the Ricardian model are convergence of relative price of goods, specialization according to comparative advantage, pattern of trade according to comparative advantage and gains from trade (no losses)

Gains from trade depends on terms of trade  $\frac{p_{Export}}{p_{Import}}$

w is the value of the marginal productivity of labor

The Ricardian model explains the real world (technology and comparative advantage rather than absolute advantage matters)


Limits: Only one factor, extreme degree of specialization, long-run model (no adjustment costs analyzed), Intra industry trade isn't explained, lack of extensions (more goods/countries)

An increase in Labor supply in Home shifts the vertical part to the right, leading to lower relative price of x, meaning lower gains from trade for Home and higher gains for Foreign

A technological improvement in Foreign's export based industries leads to a lower  $a_Y^*$

This means the opportunity cost of X increases in Foreign so  $\frac{L^*}{a_Y^*}$  increases and


$\frac{L}{a_X}$  decreases and RS decreases





For Foreign, deterioration of terms of trade ( $\frac{P_{Export}}{P_{Import}}$ ), higher absolute productivity, positive technological spillover on Home. For Home, we have improvements of terms of trade

Import biased technological progress in F



Import biased technological improvement in Foreign (lower  $a$  for  $x$ )

This means that  $\frac{a_x^*}{a_y^*}$  decreased and so: If it shifts to  $RS_1$ , each country stays perfectly specialized

and no changes to the relative price of  $X$  so no effect on home

If it shifts to  $RS_2$ , the Home terms of trade deteriorate, welfare decreases

If it shifts to  $RS_2$ , the Home terms of trade deteriorate, welfare decreases (Home is still better off than in autarky)

Overall, it benefits Home if Home's terms of trade increase and hurts it if it deteriorates Home's Terms of trade (lower, not negative gains)

Di Giovanni et al.: Is productivity growth in China beneficial for the rest of the world. Ricardian model with 75 countries, 2 factors (K and L), 19 manufacturing sectors

Their simulations show positive to negative gains, with Asian countries on average gaining more (the closer the better), countries with important textile and apparel sectors have small welfare losses

In the second simulation, we compare balanced improvement (other countries gain) and import-biased improvements (other countries may lose but higher variance also for gains) What matters is China's similarity to the world weighted average productivity and its comparative advantage: balanced growth in China keeps it similar to the typical country while unbalanced growth makes it more different from the rest of the world

Remember: The larger the difference the larger the gains



### Lecture 5: Heckscher-Ohlin Model

Different factor endowments + different factor intensities lead to gains from trade

We use two factors L and K: They are homogeneous and freely mobile across sectors but immobile across countries

We have constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal returns


Relative factor intensity:  $\frac{L_x}{K_x} > \frac{L_y}{K_y}$  (production of X is relatively intensive in L and of K is relatively intensive in K)

Home is relatively more labor-abundant than foreign, which is relatively K abundant  $(\frac{L}{K})_{Home} > (\frac{L}{K})_{Foreign}$


Perfect competition so price = marginal cost (L and K are paid the value of their marginal productivity)

Factors work in the industry that pays them the most, hence in equilibrium the two industries pay the same

We now have one constraint by type of endowments, as we must respect  $a_{KX}Q_X + a_{KY}Q_Y \leq K$  and  $a_{LX}Q_X + a_{LY}Q_Y \leq L$ :



The opportunity cost of X is low when little X is already being produced and high when lot of X is being produced (low marginal productivity of the resources). In other words, when a lot of X is produced, the marginal productivity of the resources used for it tends to be low and the opportunity cost is high



The economy produces at the point that maximizes the value of production:





$V = p_X Q_X + p_Y Q_Y \Rightarrow Q_Y = \frac{V}{p_Y} - \frac{p_X}{p_Y} Q_X$ : The slope of the iso-value line is the relative price: Efficiency is at point Q, where opportunity cost of X = Marginal benefit of X

An increase in the relative price of X will increase the slope, shift the tangency point to the right and increase production of X

Hence the supply curve is: The budget constraint is  $p_X Q_X + p_Y Q_Y = \text{Income}$ , so equivalent to the value line

Relative demand is inversely proportional to the relative price

Production and Prices





Since Home is better suited to produce x, PPF is biased towards it and inversely: In autarky, the relative price of X in Foreign is higher than in Home

In free trade, the world relative supply is a weighted average of RS in the two countries. With trade, relative prices converge. The increase in relative price increases supply of X and

reduces demand. Home partially specializes and exports X and vice versa for Foreign. Gains from trade at the aggregate level and both countries gain

Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: the country that is abundant in a factor exports the good whose production is intensive in that factor



### Lecture 6 and 7

Does international trade increase inequality?

Factors are paid the values of the marginal products and  $p_x/p_y$  determines the relative remuneration of labor  $w/r$

Supply side: An increase in the relative price of x means an increase in the relative quantity of X produced, hence increasing the relative price of labor as it uses it disproportionately: SS relationship:

If  $w/r$  increases,  $L/K$  demand decreases in both sectors Turning around the graphs and combining them, we get:

Stolper Samuelson theorem: An increase in the relative price of a good increases the real return to the factor used intensively in the production of that good, and decreases the real return to the other factor, in terms of both goods. The owners of the abundant factor gain but the owners of the scarce factor lose with international trade

Consequence of an increase in  $p_x/p_y$ :

Factors are paid at the value of the Marginal product:

$$w = p_x MP_{LX} = p_y MP_{LY} \rightarrow \frac{w}{p_x} = MP_{LX} \rightarrow \frac{w}{p_y} = MP_{LY}$$

Law of diminishing returns: If capital is constant and labor increases, then labor productivity decreases and capital productivity increases and vice versa

The convergence of prices:



At Home: Increase in  $p_x/p_y$  so increase in  $w/r$  so decrease in  $L_x/K_x$  and  $L_y/k_y$  so marginal productivity of labor increases and mp of labor decreases: workers are better off and capital owners worse off



The opposite happens in Foreign: the owners of the abundant factor gain while the owner of the scarce factor lose in real terms

In principle, if winners compensate losers, everyone is better off in free trade (Pareto improvement)

Two factors of production: L and S (low and high skilled workers),  $w_s > w_l$  2 goods: High tech good X (S-intensive) and low-tech good Y (L-intensive)



2 countries: Home is developed and S abundant and Foreign is developing and L-Abundant In autarky,  $p_x/p_y$  is higher in Foreign

SS predicts that in the developed country there will be an increase in the relative price of X (false irl), a reduction of skill intensity in both sectors (No, the opposite happens) so an increase in wage inequality (true), while the opposite happens in Foreign (Lower inequality has mixed evidence)

China Syndrome: What are the local labor market effects of import competition in the US: Rising exposure increased unemployment, lowered labor force participation and reduced wages in some area

China has very uneven export growth across sectors; the US manufacturing industry are highly concentrated geographically and US workers are not willing/able to move: The China shock displaced a million U.S. manufacturing jobs

Although Chinese imports may have reduced employment in some industries/regions, these losses can be more than offset by gains in employment in other industries/regions

Net job losses in manufacturing sectors for the US but remarkable job gains in services: international trade has an impact on the labor market in line with comparative advantage Skill-biased technological change: New technologies



(complements to skilled labor and substitutes for low-skilled labor): 2 effects: given goods prices, skilled workers become relatively more productive: increase in  $w_s/w_l$ : SS relationship shifts up. Given the skill premium, higher relative demand (shift in relative factor demands)



The SBTC explanation matches empirical observations: No changes in relative prices of high-tech goods, increased skill intensity, increasing inequality  
International trade can facilitate the adoption of ICT

SBTC also explains polarization: Higher inequality between high-income and medium-income workers, reduction of inequality between medium and low-income earners

Medium-skilled workers are those more risk of automation

SS vs SBTC: International trade is not the main driver, its impact comes from diffusing technology

However during the last two decades international trade flows have changed: more North-South



compared to the past and global value chains

An alternative explanation is offshoring



Suppose a fall in trade costs (offshoring is cheaper): We have more unskilled labor being done in Foreign (low skilled workers):

The relative demand for skilled labor increases in both countries and so their



wages increase, leading to increased inequality:

**Conclusion:** No evidence supporting the HO and SS theorem. Alternative explanations are SBTC and offshoring (in which case trade is an important driver)



### Lecture 8: The Standard Trade model

it's a combination of Ricardian and HO model

We have differences in factor endowment and/or in the use of factors giving rise to productive differences

Differences in technologies or production factors are represented by different PPF, implying different RS curves. For a given relative price, RS of Home > RS of Foreign

RS world is a weighted average of both

A higher relative price for export means that the country can buy more imports so higher TOT means higher welfare and inversely

The world market relative price falls between the two countries' autarkic relative prices. A country gains from trade thanks to the difference between world ToT and its own autarkic price Two kinds of gains: Consumption and production gains

Consumption: Imported goods are relatively cheaper than in autarky so consumers reach a higher indifference curve for a given production

Production gain; The country specializes more in the production of the good paying a higher relative price so higher GDP, income and indifference curve

'Given the higher relative price of X, the country specializes more in the production of X, GDP increases (upwards shift in the value line)

**Small vs large countries** Small countries have a negligible impact on the international market and lead to no change in the equilibrium relative price on the international market





Large countries have an impact on the international market so a shock to their relative supply or demand have an impact on the relative S or D worldwide and affects the equilibrium relative price and the terms of trade

Growth in one country only matters if it's biased: It occurs in one sector more than the other and changes the relative supply; unbiased growth is exactly equal to a change in countries' size

Biased growth in X: Tech improvement in the production of X, increase in relative endowment of labor, the relative supply of X increases, the relative supply curve shifts right and the PPF shifts out more towards X and inversely for Y (increase in relative endowment of capital, rsc shifts left...)

In a small country Assume that L increases in Home/ improvement in tech in X industry (same thing), there is an outwards shift of the PPF but since it's biased it grows more for X.



However, there is no impact on international market so no change in the slope of the isovalue line

Rybczynski theorem: For given relative goods prices, an increase in the endowment of a factor will increase output in the sector that uses this factor intensively and will decrease output in the other sector

For the welfare in home, the larger consumption set earns higher indifference curve: The impact on welfare at home is positive and no impact on the world Asian tigers and their export led growth thanks to reduction in trade barriers, they became relatively capital-abundant instead of relatively labor abundant, mainly thanks to FDI, so they gained a comparative advantage in K-intensive industries

In a closed economy, an increase in K for a given L leads to lower return to capital, but in a small open economy, goods prices determine factor prices, so



they're fixed so Rybczynski effect

**In large countries:** In Home increase in L, the relative supply of x increases RSx so the world relative supply of X increases and RS world shifts to the right => Impact on the terms of trade. The relative price of X decreases so the tot of exporters of X deteriorate


Welfare effects: At home, growth leads to higher welfare, but tot deterioration leads to lower welfare so under special conditions the effect can be negative In Foreign, the terms of trade improvement improved welfare

The differences between the two countries are now even larger so larger gains from trade

In theory US tot should have worsened with the growth of China in competing sectors, but data indicates that changes have been small with no clear trend, however those for China have worsened, suggesting their recent growth may have been export-biased

Developed countries tend to experience mild swings in their tot (around 1%). Some developing countries exports are heavily concentrated on some sectors (mineral, agricultural) and since those goods are very volatile, this leads to large swings in the terms of trade, leading to substantial changes in welfare

| Task type          | Task description  | Example of occupations                            | Effect of ICT          | Education Levels |
|--------------------|---|---|------------------------|------------------|
| Routine Manual     | Rules based; repetitive; procedural                     | Assembly line workers;                            | Direct substitution    | Low              |
| Non-Manual         |   | Clerical ; Book-keepers                           | Direct substitution    | Middle           |
| Non-Routine Manual | Abstract problem solving (analytic); mental flexibility | Managers; doctors; lawyers; scientists            | Strongly complementary | High             |
| Manual             | Environmental adaptability; Interpersonal adaptability  | Maids/Janitors; security guards; waiters; drivers | Broadly Neutral        | Low              |



### Lecture 9: Firms in the global economy

Gruber-Lloyd index:

with  $(X_i + M_i)$  the total trade in industry i and  $|X_i - M_i|$  net exports

In the case where there are no imports, only exports, we get 0, imports=exports we get 1.

Intra industry trade concerns mainly rich and intermediate countries', as well as intermediate and final goods mostly

Horizontal differentiation is over the varieties for the same quality and vertical differentiation is different quality/ price range

External economies of scale: the average cost faced by a firm decreases with the output of its industry, many small firms take prices as given an internal



economies of scale: the average cost faced by a firm decreases with its own output, few large firms set prices thanks to their market power

A price-taker firm faces an infinitely elastic demand at the given market (horizontal demand curve), the price-maker firm faces a downward sloping demand with finite elasticity.

Higher productivity implies lower marginal cost  $c$  and: larger output ( $q$ ) lower price ( $p$ ), higher markup  $M(c)$ , higher profit  $\pi(c)$ . In our case, homogeneous firms with the same  $c$

A model with market power and no strategic interaction due to many firms is called monopolistic competition

We have horizontal differentiation; each firm faces some competition but is a monopolist of its variety

Under monopolistic competition, a firm sells more as total sales in the industry increase and as prices charged by rivals increase and less as the number of

firms in the industry increases and its price increases:  $q = S \left[ \frac{1}{n} - b(p - \bar{p}) \right]$

is the market size (exogenous),  $n$  the number of firms,  $b$  is a constant representing the

responsiveness of a firm's sales to prices and  $\bar{p}$  is the average price charged by competitors

Demand:  $q = S \left[ \frac{1}{n} - b(p - \bar{p}) \right]$

If firms are symmetric, in equilibrium  $p = \bar{p}$  so  $q = S/n$

The amount of output produced by the individual firms

The amount of output produced by the individual firm is equal to its market

share Technology:  $TC = f + cq$ , all firms have the same TC function

Free entry/exit: If profits are positive, new firms enter, if profits are below 0, some exit and in equilibrium no profit:  $p = AC$


To find the equilibrium: 1) Average cost and number of firms: if  $n$  increases, firms size declines for a given market size so AC increases:  $AC = \frac{f}{q} + c$

and in equilibrium  $q = S/n$

CC curve:  $AC = \frac{fn}{S} + c$

The higher the  $n$ , the lower the exploitation of economies of scale.

| % of increase explained by the two factors     |            |
|--|------------|
| Offshoring                                     | Technology |
| Relative wage of skilled workers ( $w_S/w_L$ ) |            |
| 21 – 27 %                                      | 20 – 32%   |



In equilibrium  $MR=MC$

For the demand:  $PP: p = c + \frac{1}{bn}$

If  $p$  is above  $AC$  firms enter and vice versa

In equilibrium,  $n_A \sqrt{\frac{S}{fb}}$

If  $S$  increases,  $n$  increases less than proportionally

If  $f$  increases then  $n$  decreases, if  $b$  increases then  $n$  decreases (more competition means lower prices, lower profits)



### Monopolistic competition and trade

2 identical countries, with market size  $S$ , free trade so market size  $2S$  Larger market means more unit sold so lower  $AC$  and lower  $CC$

4 effects of trade: Price drops due to competition increasing and the number of firms increases, leading to higher variety. Although some firms do exist, the total number of firms of the two markets together is lower than twice the total number in each market before trade. Finally, Scale effect lead to more efficient production ( $q$  increases)

Hence, identical countries gain from trade thanks to lower prices, more efficient production and more variety: IIT

Irl few firms export and those that do it the most are large companies





### Lecture 10: Firms in the Global Economy

Only some firms export due to differences between firms, high productivity firms expand to serve the foreign market, low productivity firms suffer from foreign competition while least productive firms exit, so the average productivity of the industry increases when in international trade

We use the same assumption as in the Krugman model but firms have different marginal costs: a firm doesn't know its productivity until it starts producing the good, firms enter if expected profits are positive and exit if observed profits are negative

Comparing two firms, with  $c_1$  below  $c_2$ , and firm 1 larger than firm 2 ( $q_1 > q_2$ ) and charging a lower price:

Firm 1 gets higher profits. For all firms whose  $c$  is above the vertical intercept of  $D$ , they exit the market. We call the vertical intercept  $c^*$  the cutoff marginal cost  
 Under trade: Larger market leading to a higher quantity produced and higher profit but also a higher  $n$  so larger competition, lower  $q$  and lower profit  
 With homogeneous firms,  $q = S/n$  increases for all firms but for heterogeneous firms, the impact on the demand faced depends on the marginal cost of the firm

The new cutoff marginal cost is  $c'^*$  and lower than before

Trade winners generate winners and losers, there is a reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive firms so the average productivity increases: Gains from trade: Countries are more efficient


Note that in this model, all surviving firms export

Intl, we can explain the small number of firms who export due to trade cost, which reduces the profitability of exporting for all firms and makes it unprofitable for some firms

If firms pay a tariff  $t$  to sell in the foreign market, the marginal cost for exported goods is higher, firms set higher prices abroad and sell a lower quantity, leading to lower profits

In the case of a bilateral reduction in  $t$ , lower cost of exporting increase profits but increased competition on the home market leads to less demand for variety and lower profits

We thus get heterogeneous effect: firms that used to or can now export make bigger profits and those that couldn't make less. Since least productive firms leave the market, the average productivity of surviving firms is greater



Corentin Dubreucq-Pert 
$$GL = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i + M_i) - |X_i - M_i|}{\sum_{i=1}^n (X_i + M_i)}$$



## Lecture 11: Firms in the global market

An MNE manages production establishments located in at least two countries  
 Two key elements: plants in at least two countries must be involved in production and must be managed and controlled by the same firm (location and internalization)

FDI: An investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of the investor. You need to control at least 10% of stocks. 80% of global trade is connected to international trade

Horizontal offshoring: Same tasks performed abroad and domestically vs

vertical offshoring: different tasks performed at home and abroad:

Measure of GVC: FVA: foreign value added (backward), value added by foreign countries in a country's export, imported goods and services incorporated into a country's exports

DVA: Domestic Value added (Forward): Value added produced by the country in the exports of another one

GVC grew rapidly in the 90s but stagnated after the 2008 financial crisis

In vertical FDI/Offshoring: domestic and foreign plants perform different tasks along the value chain

In horizontal FDI/Offshoring: Domestic and foreign plants perform the same task

In vertical FDI/Offshoring: domestic and foreign plants perform different tasks along the value chain

**Proximity Concentration tradeoff** Trade and transport costs: Exports:

Transport costs and tariffs which they avoid with HFDI => Negative impact of plant-level economies of scale on FDI The larger the foreign market, the larger the size of the foreign plant! Positive impact on foreign market size on offshoring

The larger the local markets and the lower the barriers, the higher the probability of offshoring Customization: Local production allows more info on local consumers and customization to their needs. Thus offshoring is preferred to exports if customization is relevant



Coordination costs: Geographically dispersed plants => Coordination is more difficult Overall: Trade and transport costs +

Economies of scale - Market size + Customization + Coordination costs -

## Vertical offshoring

Differences in factor prices and costs of production: Move tasks intensive in the use of factor F where F is relatively cheaper: cost saving offshoring

Why do factor prices differ across countries: Endowments (HO) and technologies (Ricardo) Trade and V-offshoring are complements, trade barriers and transport costs reduce the



incentive to offshore production (opposite to H-offshoring)

Coordination costs: Disintegration costs: Higher cost in managing a GV, timing

Specific resources: An activity may be moved where a specific resource is available (resource seeking FDI)



Overall:

Differences in factor prices + Trade and transport costs - Coordination costs - Specific resources needed +

### Internalization

In house enables full control, so higher costs Outsourcing: Lower costs but lower control

Relevant factors are incomplete contracts and countries' structure (quality of institutions)



Incomplete contracts: It's impossible to specify all contingencies, when specific tech or knowledge is require transaction costs are high, risk of knowledge dissipation

The configuration of the GVC is determined by the complexity of the input needed (standardized or customized input), ability to codify transactions (need of specific investment to produce the input) and the capabilities in the supply base

We now have a much finer division of labor internationally, countries have different comparative advantages in different sectors and stages of production within sectors, better access to a greater variety of higher quality/cheaper intermediate inputs, greater economies of scales. GVC also spread know-how and technology

GVC trade is associated with a more than 1 percent increase in per capita income in the long run It increases employment, wages, reduces poverty




### New trends

A new model for exporting services of intangible assets: A firm outsourcing manufacturing outsources but maintains control of the production process, owns the associated IP and bears the entrepreneurial risk (Nike)

Countries like China can upgrade along the GVC



Risks: geopolitical, pandemic and environmental, companies are more likely to want to reshore and invest in resilience (diversification, nearshoring, increasing visibility, flexibility and backup inventory)



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